

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 SALT T 00152 151442Z

41

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 016089

O P 151405Z APR 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2558

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SALT TWO GENEVA 0152

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 15, 1975

(SALT TWO-612)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON  
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF APRIL 15, 1975.

QUOTE:

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON  
APRIL 15, 1975

MR. MINISTER:

I

TODAY I WANT TO ADDRESS PARAGRAPH 4 OF ARTICLE V OF THE U.S.  
DRAFT, WHICH ESTABLISHES A CEILING ON THE VOLUME AND THROW-WEIGHT  
OF A HEAVY ICBM. THE U.S. ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS PROVISION

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00152 151442Z

AND I WANT TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LED US

TO PROPOSE IT.

## II

OVER THE COURSE OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS, THE U.S. SIDE HAS REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED ITS CONCERN OVER THE INCREASING VOLUME AND THROW-WEIGHT OF SOVIET ICBMS. THESE INCREASES IN VOLUME AND THROW-WEIGHT ARE LEADING TO CORRESPONDINGLY LARGE INCREASES IN THE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF THE SOVIET ICBM FORCE. WE HAVE EMPHASIZED THE ADVERSE EFFECT SUCH INCREASES CAN HAVE ON THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, THE SIDES TOOK AN INITIAL STEP DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF ICBMS BY FREEZING THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR HEAVY ICBMS. IN ADDITION, SIGNIFICANT SIZE INCREASES IN FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS WERE PROHIBITED. WHILE THESE LIMITATIONS WERE AND REMAIN NECESSARY, THEY ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO FORESTALL FURTHER LARGE INCREASES IN DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL. AS I POINTED OUT ON APRIL 8, IN DISCUSSING THE DEFINITION OF A HEAVY ICBM, MISSILES WITH CAPABILITIES CONSIDERABLY IN EXCESS OF THOSE PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED AS "LIGHT" CAN BE DEPLOYED IN LAUNCHERS ASSOCIATED WITH "LIGHT" ICBMS. THE TECHNOLOGY WHICH ALLOWS ICBMS TO BE GIVEN SUCH INCREASED CAPABILITY WITHIN THE PROHIBITION ON SIGNIFICANT SIZE INCREASES OF FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS IS APPLICABLE TO HEAVY ICBMS. CONSEQUENTLY, WE NEED TO GO BEYOND THE EXISTING BAN ON ADDITIONAL HEAVY ICBM LAUNCHERS AND THE CONSTRAINTS ON SILO DIMENSION INCREASES IN ORDER TO REACH A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM.

## III

THUS IN ORDER TO LIMIT FURTHER INCREASES IN THE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF HEAVY ICBMS, THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT A CEILING MUST BE PLACED ON THE VOLUME AND THROW-WEIGHT OF HEAVY ICBMS. WE BELIEVE SUCH A LIMITATION IS ENTIRELY WITHIN THE INTENT OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING. IF A SIDE WERE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO INCREASE THE VOLUME AND THROW-WEIGHT OF HEAVY ICBMS THE EFFECT OF AN EQUAL AGGREGATE LIMITATION ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS COULD BE ERODED BY INCREASING THE NUMBER AND DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF WARHEADS ON THOSE ICBMS. SUCH A SITUATION WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00152 151442Z

WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF EXCESSIVE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL BY ONE SIDE CAN ONLY HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IF ONE SIDE WERE TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY A HEAVY ICBM WITH DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL EXCEEDING THAT OF THE LARGEST CURRENT HEAVY ICBM, IT WOULD BE QUITE NATURAL THAT THE OTHER SIDE COULD NOT REMAIN

INDIFFERENT TO SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT AN UNDERTAKING TO FOREGO INCREASES IN THE VOLUME AND THROW-WEIGHT OF HEAVY ICBMS WOULD CLOSE THIS CHANNEL FOR A FURTHER DESTABILIZING ARMS COMPETITION. MOREOVER, SUCH AN UNDERTAKING WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR CURRENT EFFORTS TO BROADEN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITATIONS AND TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR LATER REDUCTIONS.

IV

IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, THE U.S. HAS PROPOSED THAT, "THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST, OR DEPLOY AN ICBM HAVING A VOLUME OR THROW-WEIGHT GREATER THAN THAT OF THE LARGEST HEAVY ICBM DEPLOYED BY EITHER PARTY ON THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THIS AGREEMENT". THIS PROVISION ESTABLISHES THE VOLUME AND THE THROW-WEIGHT OF THE NEW SOVIET HEAVY ICBM WHICH WE CALL THE SS-18 AS THE UPPER LIMITS FOR THE LARGEST ICBM WHICH CAN BE DEPLOYED. THE VOLUME AND THE THROW-WEIGHT OF A BALLISTIC MISSILE ARE THE MOST APPROPRIATE INDICES OF ITS CAPABILITY. THUS LIMITING THEM LIMITS THE POTENTIAL DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF THE ICBM IN AN EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE WAY.

V

MR. MINISTER, THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH I HAVE GIVEN TODAY SUPPORT THE INCLUSION IN THE NEW AGREEMENT OF A PROVISION WHICH PLACES A CEILING ON THE VOLUME AND THROW-WEIGHT OF HEAVY ICBMS. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS ON THE CONSIDERATIONS I HAVE PUT FORTH TODAY.  
UNQUOTEJOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** SALT (ARMS CONTROL), AMBASSADORS, SPEECHES, ICBM  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 15 APR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975SALTT00152  
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**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X1  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Page Count:** 3  
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**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 JUN 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <19 JUN 2003 by WorrelSW>; APPROVED <19 JUN 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 15, 1975 (SALT TWO-612)  
**TAGS:** PARM, UR, US, (JOHNSON, U ALEXIS)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006